

Statement of FBI Position

1. It is obvious that such radio facilities set up in an official or semi-official establishment of a foreign government would be used extensively by that government's intelligence service as well as by its diplomatic staff.

Comment: This is of little significance. The accompanied diplomatic pouch is available until the actual breaking off of diplomatic relations. This pouch enjoys complete immunity from penetration and, with present international air schedules, offers a rapid channel of transmission of unlimited quantities of material to the countries of most concern to the FBI.

2. In the event of an emergency involving the United States and a foreign government having such radio rights, the United States would be in no position to control the communications of that foreign government.

Comment: It cannot be done anyway. As cited above the pouch is available. In addition, it may be safely assumed that embassies in Washington are quite aware that their telegraphic communications might be interrupted, and the countries which consider it desirable already have radio equipment installed even as we do in our overseas posts.

3. It also must be realized that radio transmissions can be sent at such a high rate of speed as to make interception most difficult. Even when proper interception is effected, the time-consuming problem of decipherment remains with no guarantee of success.

Comment: It is much more likely that high-speed clandestine means designed to make interception difficult are being used now or would be used if necessary if proper authority for operation of a diplomatic radio station is not obtainable. In connection with the time-consuming problem of decipherment the use of radio transmission has no bearing. The same problem exists with cable traffic. *(Continued)

4. It is believed that the amount of radio traffic resulting therefrom would be considerable.

Comment: This is not true due principally to the low power the method of keying and the distance involved.

5. The observation by the CIA that limited reciprocal rights would be negotiated with a few select foreign governments, when deemed to be in the best interest of the United States, has merit, but it also must be considered that in the field of international affairs, a friendly nation today is not necessarily a dependable ally tomorrow.

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Comment: Friendliness is not criteria. Diplomatic relations with countries where we need radio stations in our embassies is the determining factor.

6. It is felt that such reciprocal radio agreements permitting foreign governments to operate radio facilities in the United States would aid considerably to the internal security problems already facing United States domestic intelligence agencies.

Comment: This is an opinion that we do not share in as much as the accompanied diplomatic air pouch is available and the registered mail service of the United States is also available for use by any of the foreign embassies to communications between embassies in Washington and points within or without the United States.

7. It is our feeling that you would be interested in this CIA proposal as well as in our comments as to the possible adverse effects such reciprocal radio agreements would have on the internal security of the United States.

Comment: Little adverse affects can be foreseen. We are no longer an isolated nation. We are the world's leader and must accept that responsibility as well as create the tools necessary to discharging it.

Considering the intelligence factor the use of diplomatic radio facilities are really a modern extension of the time-honored right of the diplomatic pouch.

*8. Continued

Comment: In addition the foreign missions at Washington have open access to the international telegraph service and are in a position to lease international radio or cable channels.

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